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FROM FOUNDATIONAL LAW TO LIMITING PRINCIPLES IN FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW.
Alex Tallchief Skibine*
INTRODUCTION
In a noted article, the late Philip Frickey described how federal Indian law, since
its inception, has been “exceptional” in the sense of being distinctive compared to other
areas of American Public Law.1 The foundational principle animating this
exceptionalism is Chief Justice Marshall’s description of Indian nations as Domestic
Dependent Nations that, although existing within the territorial boundaries of the United
States, have retained many aspects of their original sovereignty.2 Professor Frickey,
however, also described how more recently Federal Indian Law’s exceptionalism was
being dismantled by what he called a “flattening of federal Indian law into American
Public law by importing general constitutional and subconstitutional values into the
field.”3 In my view, one of the main reason for the Court’s failure to stand by the
Exceptionalism of the past is that the political, economic, and social position of tribes
within the United States has dramatically changed since these exceptional principles
were initially developed. From conquered nations restricted to isolated reservations
with a poor understanding of American society, Indian nations are now part of the
economic and political life to the United States. Most reservations are no longer
isolated or inhabited only by Indians, and tribal leaders have acquired a sophisticated
understanding of the United States legal and political system. It is, therefore, not
surprising that law is trying to catch up with these new realities.
Although this can explain why federal Indian law’s exceptionalism is changing, it
does not explain why it is changing in the particular way that it is. In this Article, I am
*
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See Philip P. Frickey, Native American Exceptionalism in American Public Law, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 431
(2005).
2
From this principle, the Court has derived three other principal doctrines: the congressional plenary
Power doctrine giving Congress exclusive and plenary authority over Indian Affairs, the Indian trust
doctrine under which the United States has a duty of protection towards the tribes, and the Indian
Preemption doctrine that presumes that states do not have jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country.
From the Indian sovereignty doctrine, the Court derived one important sub doctrine, the tribal sovereign
immunity doctrine. From the congressional plenary power doctrine, the Court derived the Mancari subdoctrine, allowing Congress to single out Indians for special treatment without such classification being
considered a racial classification. Finally, from the trust doctrine, the Court derived the Indian canons of
statutory and treaty interpretations.
3
See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian tribal
Authority over Non-Members, 109 Yale L. J. 1, 7. According to Professor Frickey, this “flattening” has
been accomplished by the Court in essentially four ways: First, abandoning the Indian law canons of
statutory construction. Second, using Federal common law under the guise of statutory interpretation.
Third, using constitutional values as a premise for its common law even though the constitution is not
strictly speaking applied to Indian tribes. Fourth, importing principles from the general law to harmonize its
federal common law decisions with general notions of federal law.
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arguing that one of the reason animating the Court’s move away from Justice Marshall’s
exceptionalism is its fear that under traditional foundational principles of federal Indian
law,4 Indian tribes may gain what the court subjectively perceives to be “unfair”
advantages over non-Indians. Therefore, the Court has been looking for limiting
principles tending to achieve level playing fields between tribal and non-tribal actors.5
This Article also argues, however, that while looking for a level playing field may sound
like a worthwhile goal, there are many pitfalls involved in this process that may end up
hurting tribal sovereign interests.
I realize that describing the Court as looking for a “level playing field” may sound
too generous to some and it is true that at times, the Court’s jurisprudence seems
animated by unfounded and irrational fears about Indian nations. One area where fear
of an unlevelled playing field has made the Court overreact has been in the area of
tribal jurisdiction over non-members. The foundational principle here was that although
Indian tribes could no longer be considered foreign nations capable of having
independent relations with other foreign nations, they still retained all their original
inherent sovereign powers unless such powers had be taken away by Acts of Congress
or given up in treaties entered with the United States.6 However, in 1981, the Court
came up with a limiting principle according to which Indian tribes could only exercise
those inherent sovereign powers that were “necessary” to tribal self-government.7
While some pro tribal attorneys at the time expressed the belief that they could work
around this limiting principle, the Supreme Court has, in the great majority of cases,
refused to uphold tribal jurisdiction over non-members.8
Because that subject has been already much discussed by a number of
scholars,9 this article will analyze other areas of Federal Indian law where the
application of exceptionalism and foundational principles is especially likely to motivate
the Court to search for limiting principles in the near future. Thus, Part II will focus on
Tribal sovereign immunity cases and Part III will analyze tribal state conflicts involving
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On foundational principles of federal Indian law, see David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural
Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 Cal L. Rev. 1573 (1996).
5
In previous writings, I have argued that the Court was conscious that the tribes were being incorporated
as the third Sovereign into our federalism but was also aware that Congress was either unwilling or
incapable of adjusting the parameters governing this incorporation. To counter this perceived
Congressional paralysis, the Court assumed the lead in defining the terms of this tribal incorporation. See
Alexander Tallchief Skibine, The Supreme Court’s Last 30 years of Federal Indian Law: Looking for
Equilibrium or Supremacy? 8 Colum. J. Race & L. 277 (2018).
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See Felix Cohen Handbook of Federal Indian Law 2012 Ed, pp. 206-211.
7
See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Three years earlier, the Court had also held that
Indian tribes did not have the inherent sovereign power to prosecute non-tribal members. See Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
8
See Skibine, Supreme Court’s last 30 Years, supra at note 5.
9
The leading article is probably Philip Frickey, Our Age of Colonialism, supra at note 3. See also
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 121 (2006), and
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and The Inherent Powers of Indian
Tribes, 39 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 77, 83-99 (2014-2015).
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off-reservation treaty rights.10 Finally, Part IV focuses on state taxing power within
Indian reservations. Not only is the judicial search for a level playing field evident in
these cases but the evolution of the law in this area should serve as a cautionary tale
for the areas of law covered in Parts II and III. Thus, what started out as a search for a
fair solution between conflicting tribal and state taxing interests ended up being used to
promote state sovereign interests to the detriment of tribal sovereign and economic
interests.
PART II: The level playing field principle in tribal sovereign immunity cases.
Foundational principle: As stated by the Supreme Court, tribal sovereign immunity
“is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance.”11 Furthermore,
only Congress, pursuant to its plenary power, can abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.12
However, as recently stated by the Court, another governing principle concerning
congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity is that “such a congressional
decision must be clear. The baseline position, we have often held, is tribal immunity;
and “[t]o abrogate [such] immunity, Congress must ‘unequivocally’ express that
purpose.”13
1. Level Playing Field and Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Indian Gaming.
Unlike other attributes of tribal sovereignty, notably inherent tribal jurisdiction over
non-members, tribal sovereign immunity has, for the most part, remained unscathed
from Supreme Court attacks.14 Thus, the Court reaffirmed its support for tribal
sovereign immunity in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,15 even though the
10

Not that these are the only two areas where limiting principles are at play. On “Limiting Principles” in
Indian Free Exercise of religion cases, see Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering
Practices in American Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 Conn. L. Rev 387 (2012). In Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), for instance, the Court refused to enjoin the
construction of a logging road through an area considered sacred to some Indians. The Court’s refusal to
give constitutional protections to such sites was heavily influenced by the lack of “limiting principles” in
such claims. Thus, the Court stated “Respondents attempt to stress the limits of the religious servitude
that they are now seeking to impose on the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest…
Nothing in the principle for which they contend, however, would distinguish this case from another lawsuit
in which they (or similarly situated religious objectors) might seek to exclude all human activity but their
own from sacred areas of the public lands… No disrespect for these [religious] practices is implied when
one notes that such beliefs could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious
tracts of public property. Even without anticipating future cases, the diminution of the Government's
property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the Indian religion, would in this case be far from trivial.”
Id., at 452-453.
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concept had only received lukewarm support sixteen years earlier in Kiowa Tribe v.
Manufacturing Technologies.16 At issue in Bay Mills was whether the State of Michigan
could sue the Tribe for opening a casino on lands that were allegedly not “Indian lands”
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).17 IGRA made casino gaming on
Indian land legal under certain conditions, one of which was for the tribe to have entered
into a gaming compact with the State.18 IGRA also abrogated tribal sovereign immunity
so that a state could sue a tribe alleged to be conducting gaming on Indian lands in
violation of the tribal state compact.19 The problem facing Michigan was that it was
alleging that the tribal gaming was illegal because it was not conducted on “Indian
lands.” Yet, IGRA only abrogated sovereign immunity to challenge illegal gaming
conducted on “Indian lands.” In other words, there was no abrogation of tribal sovereign
immunity to challenge gaming NOT conducted on Indian lands.20 The Court in Bay Mills
upheld the tribal immunity because
“As “domestic dependent nations,” Indian tribes exercise sovereignty subject to the
will of the Federal Government. Sovereignty implies immunity from lawsuits.
Subjection means (among much else) that Congress can abrogate that immunity as
and to the extent it wishes. If Congress had authorized this suit, Bay Mills would
have no valid grounds to object. But Congress has not done so: The abrogation of
immunity in IGRA applies to gaming on, but not off, Indian lands. We will not rewrite
Congress's handiwork.”21
In this area of the law, the limiting principle at first seems fair to Indian Nations in
that it argues that they should be on a level playing field with states and therefore have
the same degree of sovereign immunity that states enjoy. Thus, back in the mid 1980’s,
when Congress was debating the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the rallying battle cry
of those in Congress opposed to what they perceived as a pro-tribal gaming bill
sponsored by Morris Udall was that they wanted a “level playing field” when it came to

16

523 U.S. 751 (1998), (stating “There are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine… In
our interdependent and mobile society, however, tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to
safeguard tribal self-governance. This is evident when tribes take part in the Nation's commerce. Tribal
enterprises now include ski resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians. In this economic
context, immunity can harm those who are unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of
tribal immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims. These considerations
might suggest a need to abrogate tribal immunity, at least as an overarching rule… we defer to the role
Congress may wish to exercise in this important judgment.” ) Id., at 758.
17
Pub. L. 100-497, codified at 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721.
18
The Tribal-State compact provisions are codified at 25 U.S.C. 2710.
19
The abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity is contained in Section 7(d)(7)(A) (ii) of IGRA, codified at
25 U.S.C. 2701 et. seq.
20
25 U.S.C 2703 of IGRA defines “Indian lands” as all lands within Indian reservations, lands held in trust
by the United States for the benefit of Indians or Indian tribes, and lands held by Indians subject to a
restriction against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.
21
134 S. Ct. 2024, 2039.
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gaming on Indian reservations.22 My immediate reaction at the time was to question
why there should be a level playing field between tribes and anyone when the gaming
was on Indian reservations. Eventually, I came to accept that the notion of a level
playing field between states and tribes had some merit,23 but only if the tribes were
awarded the same political dignity as States within our federalist system.
The Congress in IGRA ended up crafting a delicate balance between tribal and
state interests requiring the tribes to enter into gaming compacts with states before
gaming could be conducted on their reservations but also allowing tribes to sue states in
federal court if the states failed to negotiate the compacts in good faith.24
The idea of a level playing field between tribes and states under IGRA was
endorsed by Justice Sotomayor in her concurring opinion in Bay Mills when she stated
As the principal dissent observes, “comity is about one sovereign respecting the
dignity of another.” This Court would hardly foster respect for the dignity of Tribes
by allowing States to sue Tribes for commercial activity on State lands, while
prohibiting Tribes from suing States for commercial activity on Indian lands. Both
States and Tribes are domestic governments who come to this Court with
sovereignty that they have not entirely ceded to the Federal Government.25
The same level playing field idea in the area of gaming had been discussed in an earlier
case, Chickasaw Nation v. United States, where Justice O’Connor in dissent objected to
the majority’s holding allowing the federal government to tax tribal gaming revenues
pursuant to IGRA. Her dissent raised the argument that levelling the playing field with
the states required the tribes to benefit from the same exemption from federal taxation.
If anything, congressional policy weighs in favor of the Nations. Congress' central
purpose in enacting IGRA was “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of
gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development,
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.” Exempting Nations from federal
gaming taxation in the same manner as States preserves the Nations'
sovereignty and avoids giving state gaming a competitive advantage that would
interfere with the Nations' ability to raise revenue in this manner.26
The Court, however, upset the delicate balance struck by Congress in IGRA in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida when it ruled that Congress could not, under its Article I
22

At the time, the author was Deputy Counsel for Indian Affairs for the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, chaired at the time by Congressman Morris Udall.
23
But see Greg Ablavsky, Upper Skagit v. Lundgren: Deceptively Straightforward Case Raises
rd
Fundamental Questions about Native Nations, History, and Sovereignty, May 23 Stanford Blog,
commenting on the case and questioning why tribe should be treated like states in this case when it is to
their disadvantage when, in many other cases, they are not treated like states when it would be to their
advantage.
24
See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act at 15 U.S.C. 2710 (d)(7).
25
134 S. Ct. 2024, 2042 (2014).
26
Chickasaw Nation v. U.S., 534 U.S. 84, 99 (U.S., 2001).
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powers, abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity so as to allow
Indian tribes to sue the states.27 Seminole Tribe highlights one of the potential problem
with looking for a level playing field between tribes and states in the area of sovereign
immunity: The States sovereign immunity is protected in the Constitution while tribal
sovereign immunity is a doctrine of federal common law. This means that Congress
can only abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to constitutional restrictions,28
while tribal sovereign immunity can be abrogated by Congress at will. The question
here is whether a level playing field between tribes and states can still occur within
these parameters. The odds for that are not that good, at least not as far as Indian
gaming is concerned.29
2. Level Playing Field with States in Off-Reservation sovereign immunity cases.
In many contentious areas involving tribal versus non-tribal and state interests,
the notion of congressional plenary power in Indian Affairs used to prevent the Court
from venturing into unchartered territory and trying to come up with judicial solutions to
conflicts that should be resolved by Congress. Tribal sovereign immunity is such an
area. As stated by Justice Kagan in Bay Mills “We ruled that way for a single simple
reason: because it is fundamentally Congress’s job, not ours, to determine whether or
how to limit tribal immunity. The special brand of sovereignty the tribes retain—both in
nature and extent—rests in the hands of Congress.”30
Judicial respect for Congressional prerogatives, however, may be waning.31 One
good example of this lack of patience with Congress and the Court’s willingness to treat
tribes the same as states for the purpose of reaching a level playing field is a somewhat
surprising opinion by Justice Sotomoyor in Lewis v. Clark.32 The Court there refused to
extend the tribe’s immunity to a tribal employee alleged to have been negligent when
operating a tribal vehicle within the scope of his employment but on a state highway
located outside the Indian reservation. In coming to its decision, the Court did mention
that “[T]he judgment will not operate against the Tribe. This is not a suit against Clarke
in his official capacity. It is simply a suit against Clarke to recover for his personal
actions, which will not require action by the sovereign or disturb the sovereign's
property.” 33 However, the Court also took into account whether similar state employees
would have enjoyed the State’s sovereign immunity in such situations. After remarking
that a state employee would not have enjoyed sovereign immunity in similar
27

517 U.S. 44 (1996).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)(requiring any such legislation necessary to enforce
th
the 14 Amendment to be congruent and proportional to the history of alleged constitutional violations.)
29
But see, Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, Negotiating Meaningful Concessions from States in Gaming Compacts
to Further Tribal Economic Development Satisfying the Economic Benefit Test, 54 S.D. L. Rev. 419
(2009).
30
134 S. Ct. 2024, at 2037 (2014).
31
See Skibine, The Supreme Court’s Last 30 years of Federal Indian Law, supra note 5.
32
137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017).
33
Id., at 1291.
28
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circumstances, the Court stated “There is no reason to depart from these general rules
in the context of tribal sovereign immunity.”34
A level playing field between tribes and other sovereigns concerning sovereign
immunity was also considered in the Court’s most recent sovereign immunity decision,
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren.35 In that case, the tribe had purchased a tract of
land that used to be within the tribe’s ancestral territory. When the tribe commissioned
a survey of the land, it thought that a fence put in place by the adjoining landowners to
demarcate their property was in the wrong place and notified them that it intended to
remove the fence. The neighbors responded by filing a quiet title action in Washington
state court, claiming title by adverse possession and mutual acquiescence. The Tribe
answered by claiming sovereign immunity from such lawsuits in state court. After
hearing oral arguments, the Supreme Court remanded. Although the Court held that
the Washington Supreme Court had wrongly interpreted a previous decision as
precluding the defense of tribal sovereign immunity,36 it remanded the case because the
non-tribal party had raised an argument at the Supreme Court that had not be raised in
the lower courts or even in the initial cert briefs.37 That argument relied on the
“immovable property” doctrine, a common law doctrine under which “sovereigns
enjoyed no immunity from actions involving immovable property located in the territory
of another sovereign.”38
Four Justices joined Justice Gorsuch’s opinion. To these Justices, the case
should be remanded because “Determining the limits on the sovereign immunity held by
Indian tribes is a grave question; the answer will affect all tribes, not just the one before
us; and the alternative argument for affirmance did not emerge until late in this case.”39
Only Justices Thomas and Alito in dissent were willing to decide the issue immediately
and for them the tribe’s immunity in this area should be treated just like the immunity of
other sovereigns. According to Justices Thomas and Alito, “the immovable property
exception has been hornbook law almost as long as there have been hornbooks.”40
Therefore, the defense of sovereign immunity should not be available to the tribe in this
case.
Justice Gorsuch was right, however, that determining whether the tribes’
sovereign immunity should be larger than that of other sovereigns is a “grave question,”
and one that “may turn out to be more complicated than the dissent promises.”41
Whether the immovable property exception rules the day as far as states are concerned
34

Id., at 1290-91.
138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018).
36
Id., at 1653, interpreting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251
(1992).
37
Id., at 1654.
38
Id., at 1653
39
Id. at 1654
40
Id., at 1657 (Thomas dissenting).
41
Id., at 1654 (Roberts concurring).
35
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is very debatable. Justice Roberts in his concurrence asserted that “The same rule
applies as a limitation on the sovereign immunity of States claiming an interest in land
located within other States,42 but many states filed amicus briefs with the Court arguing
that the doctrine is antiquated and should no longer be applicable.43
After acknowledging that the only question in this case was “whether different
principles afford Indian tribes a broader immunity [than other sovereigns] from actions
involving off-reservation lands,”44 Justice Roberts added “But if it turns out that the rule
does not extend to tribal assertions of rights in non-trust, non-reservation property, the
applicability of sovereign immunity in such circumstances would, in my view, need to be
addressed in a future case.”45 I have a feeling that if the lower court on remand finds
the immovable property doctrine not applicable to tribes as it is to states, the level
playing field principle will weigh heavily in influencing the likes of Justices Roberts and
Kavanaugh to join Justices Thomas and Alito should this case makes its way back to
the Supreme Court. These four would only need one more to constitute a majority. If I
was the tribal attorney, I would be extremely apprehensive in bringing this case or a
similar one back to the Court.
A case about tribal sovereign immunity involving off-reservation conduct may
already be on the horizon. In Wilkes v. PCI Gaming authority,46 the Alabama Supreme
Court held that the Poarch Band of Creek Indians could not invoke sovereign immunity
to protect the Tribe from a lawsuit filed by non-Indians over an automobile accident that
occurred outside the reservation. The facts are not good for the Tribe. The non-tribal
parties were alleging that a tribal employee driving a tribal vehicle was under the
influence of alcohol when her vehicle collided with the plaintiffs’ automobile. Because
the plaintiffs alleged that tribal officials were aware of the driver’s drinking problem, they
are suing the tribe for negligence and wantonness premised on the Tribe’s hiring,
retaining, and supervising the driver of the vehicle.
The Alabama Court was aware that many lower federal courts, as well as other
state courts, have upheld tribal sovereign immunity in similar cases. However, it relied
heavily on Justice Kennedy’s dicta in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing technologies to the
effect that there were “reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine.”47 It
also relied on footnote 8 of Justice Kagan’s more recent Bay Mills opinion to the effect
that the Court had never “specifically addressed (nor as far as we are aware, has
Congress) whether immunity should apply in the ordinary way if a tort victim, or other
plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe, has no alternative way to obtain relief

42

138 S. Ct. at 1655, citing Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480-482 (1924).
rd
See Jenn Weddle Guest Post on the May 23 2018 Turtle Blog.
44
138 S. Ct, at 1655 (Roberts concurring).
45
Id., at 1656.
46
2017 WL 4385738.
47
523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998). The full text of Justice Kennedy’s comment is replicated at note 15, supra.
43
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for off-reservation commercial conduct.”48 The Tribe has petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari. Strangely, the tribal petition never mentioned whether the
plaintiffs could sue the tribe in tribal court. Instead, the Tribe addressed Baymills’
footnote 8 by pointing out that pursuant to Lewis v. Clark, the plaintiffs had already filed
a lawsuit against the driver of the tribal truck.49 Whether this option will be enough to
satisfy a majority of the Court should the Court decides to take the case is highly
debatable.
3. Problems with treating tribes like states when it comes to Sovereign Immunity:
The Allergan litigation.
A case perhaps making its way to the Supreme Court is the Allergan Restasis
litigation. The litigation involved two different fronts. First, Allergan sued in federal court
seeking to protect its Restasis patents. Secondly, Mylan Pharmaceuticals petitioned the
Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB), for inter partes review (IPR) of the Restasis
patents. Inter Partes Review is an administrative procedure set up in the America
Invents Act to allow the Patents and Trademark Office (PTO) to review expeditiously the
validity of a patent that was previously awarded.50 After the litigation had started,
Allergan and the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe notified the federal court and the PTAB that all
of Allergan’s challenged patents had been assigned to the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe and
that the tribe had granted back to Allergan the exclusive license to the patents. Under
the deal, the tribe received $13.5 million upon execution of the agreement and will
receive $15 million in annual royalties after that.
In the federal court proceedings, after ordering the joinder of the tribe as a coplaintiff, the judge was concerned by the lack of a limiting principle if tribal sovereign
immunity was upheld. Thus, he stated that if Allergan’s tactic was successful, others
could also use it and this “could spell the end of the PTO’s IPR program which was a
central component of the American Invents Act of 2011.”51 Although the court
eventually held that the Restasis patents were invalid based on obviousness, this ruling
was appealed to the Federal Circuit. Similarly, in the inter partes Review, the PTAB
refused to dismiss the proceedings in spite of tribal sovereign immunity.52 The PTAB
spent most of its decision arguing that because Allergan was the true owner of the
patents and can defend the interest of the tribe adequately, the IPR proceedings could
continue without the tribe.53 However, after observing that the Tribe had not pointed to
48

Michigan v. Bat Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct 2024, 2036, n. 8.
Brief for the Petitioners in Poarch Band of Creeks v. Wilkes, at page 25. For discussion of Lewis v.
Clark, see discussion at notes supra at notes 31-33.
50
Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
51
Allergan v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, 2017 WL 4803941. The judge also intimated that if it was up to him,
the agreement between the Tribe and Allergan would be set aside as against Public Policy.Id., at 2017
WL 4803941.
52
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. St Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2017-01127 (PTAB, Feb 23, 2018)
53
Mylan Pharm. V. St Regis Mohawk Tribe, pp. 18-19. The Board also ruled that even if the Tribe had
sovereign immunity, it was not an indispensable party under Rule 19B of the Rules of Federal Civil
Procedures. These parts of the Board’s decision are not the concern of this Article as they involve
49
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any authority confirming that the same principles supporting state sovereign immunity
should be applicable to tribal immunity,54 the Board held that tribal sovereign immunity,
generally speaking, does not apply to IPR type proceedings.55 To make this argument,
the Board argued that IPR proceedings are akin to federal enforcement proceedings
brought by a federal agency. Just like the federal court’s ruling, the PTAB’s decision
was also appealed to the Federal Circuit.56
On Appeal from the Board’s decision, the Tribe insisted that tribal sovereign
immunity is applicable to IPR proceedings based on the following arguments.57 First,
the Board has previously recognized sovereign immunity when invoked by state
universities,58 and there are no meaningful differences between the Universities and the
tribe’s invocation of sovereign immunity in this context. Secondly, sovereign immunity is
applicable in federal administrative agency proceedings,59 and inter partes review is
such a proceeding. Third, inter partes Review cannot be categorized as a federal
agency enforcement proceeding where sovereign immunity would not be available.60
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not agree with the Tribe’s
arguments.61 Instead, relying partly on a recent Supreme Court case,62 for the
proposition that IPR is a matter “which arise[s] between the Government and persons
subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions
of the executive or legislative departments,”63 it agreed with the Appellees that
sovereign immunity was not applicable to the IPR process. The Court began by stating
“IPR is neither clearly a judicial proceeding instituted by a private party nor clearly an
enforcement action brought by the federal government. It is a “hybrid proceeding” with
“adjudicatory characteristics” similar to court proceedings, but in other respects it “is
less like a judicial proceeding and more like a specialized agency proceeding.”64
Therefore, the Court concluded that “IPR is more like an agency enforcement action
primarily areas of civil procedure and patent law that do not implicate tribal interests under federal Indian
law.
54
Id., at pp 8-10
55
Id., at 11-17.
56
See Petitioner’s brief, 2018 WL 1989302.
57
See Petitioner’s brief, 2018 WL 1989302.
58
See Covidien v. University of Florida, IPR2016-01274 (Jan. 25, 2017) NeoChord Inc., v. University of
Maryland. No. IPR2016-00208 (May 23, 2017), Reactive Surfaces v. Toyota Motor, IPR2016-01914 (July
13, 2017).
59
See Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
60
The Tribe also continued to argue that the Board was wrong in holding that Allergan was the effective
patent owner and, therefore, could not be withdrawn as a party to the proceedings. Similarly, the Tribe
argued that the Board was wrong to find that even if Allergan was the effective patent owner, the Tribe
was not an indispensable party under the Rule 19 B of the federal Rules of Civil Procedure
61
See Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, 896 F.3d 1322 (2018)
62
Oil States Energy Services v. Greene’s Energy Group, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (Upholding the
constitutionality of Inter Partes Review because the revocation of a previously granted patent involved
adjudication of a public right and, therefore, could be delegated to a non-Article III Court.
63
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 896 F.3d 1322,1327( 2018).
64

Id., at 1326.
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than a civil suit brought by a private party.”65 As such, tribal immunity was not
implicated.66 Whether the Court is correct in its conclusion that IPR is more like an
agency enforcement action is beyond the scope of this Article.67 In some ways, the
ground used by the court may be one of the least harmful to tribal interests generally
speaking, as the rational used should not impact tribal sovereign immunity beyond the
narrow confines of IPR proceedings.
This Article does not take a position on the wisdom of the tribal-Allergan agreement
from a social policy perspective.68 Neither does it take a position on whether sovereign
immunity should generally be available to either states or tribes in such cases.69
However, because this Article argues that there should be a level playing field between
tribes and states, the concern here is that although the tribe lost on the sovereign
immunity issue, eventually, the states may not. Therefore, this article will next focus on
whether there are meaningful differences between invocation of state and tribal
sovereign immunity in the patent IPR context.

An argument made by the Appellees in their brief was that tribal sovereign immunity
should not apply to the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe in this case because the agreement
with Allergan was a “sham” devised to avoid the patents being challenged in agency or
court proceedings.70 Although the PTAB and the Federal Circuit did not address this
argument, the federal district court judge in the parallel Federal court proceeding stated
The Court has serious concerns about the legitimacy of the tactic that Allergan and
the Tribe have employed. The essence of the matter is this: Allergan purports to
have sold the patents to the Tribe, but in reality it has paid the Tribe to allow Allergan

65

Id., at 1327.
As stated by the Court, “The Director’s important role as a gatekeeper and the Board’s authority to
proceed in the absence of the parties convinces us that the USPTO is acting as the United States in its
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keeping patent monopolies within their legitimate scope.” Id., 1329.
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to purchase—or perhaps more precisely, to rent—the Tribe's sovereign immunity in
order to defeat the pending IPR proceedings in the PTO.71
In order to buy into this line of reasoning, a court would first have to distinguish
cases where state universities have successfully invoked their sovereign immunity in
IPR proceedings. It is true that State Universities are usually involved in the
development of patents while Indian tribes are not. In their appeals brief, for instance,
the Appellees took the Tribe to task for suggesting that it has done “nothing more than
follow the model created by state universities,” stating:
That is not so. State universities' patent portfolios are often derived from research
funded by the State, while the Tribe funded none of the research and development
involving these patents… The Tribe was a complete stranger to Restasis (and to
pharmaceutical patents in general) until Allergan paid it to enter into a transaction
after the close of evidence in these IPRs.72
Although some of the cases like Covidian and Eriksson did not involve any “transfer”
of patents to universities,73 other like Reactive Surface and NeoChord did.74 However,
the university cases have so far not involved patents being transferred to a State
University so that it could license them back in order for the licensee to benefit from the
licensor’s sovereign immunity. On the other hand, it is true that in non-IPR contexts, the
states have previously manipulate their sovereign immunity in order to avoid liability.
For instance, in their appellate brief to the Circuit, the Tribe cited 4 cases for the
proposition that other Sovereigns also use immunity to avoid liability in pending
lawsuits.75 While the first two cited cases, Oracle Am and Kroll, can be distinguished on
their facts, the last two cannot as they involve transfer of liability from a non-sovereign
to a state entity that resulted in successful assertion of state sovereign immunity. In
Cabrero, especially, the transfer was done for the very purpose of avoiding liability.76
Allowing sovereign immunity to be invoked in some cases but not in others would
mean having a court dictate to a sovereign when use of sovereign immunity is proper.
That is problematic. The tribes, like other sovereigns, are involved in myriads of
economic activities. The court would have to devise a test to distinguish among those.
This is exactly what the Court refused to do in Kiowa tribe v. Manufacturing
71
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Technologies when it did not restrict the use of tribal sovereign immunity for cases
involving tribal commercial activities and arising outside Indian reservations.77
A more serious argument made by the Appellees in their brief to the Federal Circuit
was that even if state universities can invoke sovereign immunity in such cases, the
tribes cannot because, unlike State sovereign immunity which is mandated under the
Eleventh Amendment to protect norms of federalism, tribal sovereign immunity is only a
doctrine of federal common law.78 The Federal Circuit refused to enter this debate,
concluding its opinion by stating “In this case we are only deciding whether tribal
immunity applies in IPR. While we recognize there are many parallels, we leave for
another day the question of whether there is any reason to treat state sovereign
immunity differently,”79 The reluctance of the Federal Circuit to make a pronouncement
on the application of state sovereign immunity is puzzling because recent decisions of
the PTAB have already held that state sovereign immunity is applicable to inter partes
review,80 and so did the Federal Circuit in Vas-Cath Inc., v. Curators of the University of
Missouri.81
Congress may in fact lack the constitutional authority to abrogate state sovereign
immunity for the purpose of inter partes review. The Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida
held that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity under its Article I
powers.82 Therefore, neither the Patent Clause,83 nor the Commerce Clause,84 are
legitimate sources of power for Congress in this area. This leaves Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment,85 as the only potential source of authority. However, in Florida Prepaid v.
College Savings Bank,86 the Supreme Court held that even if the Patent Remedy Act
was enacted under the Enforcement Clause of the 14th Amendment, it still could not
meet the City of Boerne congruent and proportional test and was therefore not
“appropriate” legislation under Section 5.87 The PTAB in Neochord v. University of
77
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Maryland followed suit and held that Congress could not have abrogated the states’
sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment when it established the IPR
procedures.88 The Allergan litigation, therefore, may be another example where treating
tribes like states in the hope of reaching a level playing field may just not be possible
because of constitutional constraints.
PART III: Limiting Principles in Off Reservation Indian Treaty cases:
The Foundational principles of treaty interpretation are that treaties made with Indian
nations are to be construed the way the Indians understood them at the time of the
signing.89 Furthermore, ambiguous expressions are supposed to be interpreted to the
Indians’ benefit.90 Finally, although only Congress can abrogate Indian treaties, a treaty
will only be considered abrogated if a court finds clear evidence that Congress actually
considered the Indians’ treaty rights and decided to abrogate them.91
Limiting principles tending to achieve a level playing field between tribes and states
have been at play in regulations of hunting and fishing treaty rights. Thus, states have
been allowed to regulate Tribal fishing rights both off and even on Indian reservations
as long as the regulations are necessary for the conservation of a scarce renewable
natural resource and as long as they do not discriminate against tribal members.92 A
good example of a limiting principle in this area was the use of the term “moderate
living” used by Justice Stevens in the 1979 Washington treaty fishing case.93 After
agreeing that the 1855 treaty of Point Elliott reserved to the Tribes up to 50% of the
harvestable fish resource, Justice Stevens added:
It bears repeating, however, that the 50% figure imposes a maximum but not a
minimum allocation… [t]he central principle here must be that Indian treaty rights to
a natural resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians
secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a
livelihood—that is to say, a moderate living.94
No one seems to really know where Justice Stevens derived this “moderate living”
standard, although some speculate that he just came up with it in order to persuade
other Justices to join his opinion. As stated by the late Dean David Getches “In the third
draft of his opinion, [Justice Stevens] added language to stress that the right of tribes
stopped when they reached a “moderate” living standard, an idea not offered by any
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”) Id.,
at 520.
88
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party or suggested in any of the briefs... Chief Justice Burger characterized Stevens'
approach as “an ‘arbitration’ holding,” and thus Stevens secured a majority vote.”95
The “moderate living” standard became a source of controversy during the
Supreme Court’s oral argument in the recently heard “culverts” case.96 At issue in the
case was whether the State of Washington had a duty to modify many of its culverts so
that they could allow the salmon to pass through.97 The Ninth Circuit held that in
building and maintaining barrier culverts, Washington had violated its obligations under
the treaties.98 At the oral argument, it seems that a majority of the Justices were
attempting to find a limiting principle defining the scope of the State’s duty to prevent its
activities from reducing the salmon runs. The State argued that the 9th Circuit’s opinion
had no limiting principle on the treaty right of the tribes and if left intact, the opinion
would allow tribes to regulate all activities within the state that may have an impact on
the salmon population.99
One area of disagreement between the tribes and the State was whether the 9th
Circuit had used the “moderate living” standard in order to hold that the State of
Washington had a duty to repair hundreds of culverts preventing or impairing the
salmon from passing through. The problem was that the 9th Circuit panel decision was
far from pellucid on this point. On one hand, it first stated “even in the absence of an
explicit promise [by Governor Stevens], we would infer a promise that the number of fish
would always be sufficient to provide a “moderate living” to the Tribes.”100 However, it
followed that by stating “The “measure of the State's obligation” therefore depends “on
all the facts presented” in the “particular dispute” now before us.”101 While this
statement seems to call for an ad-hoc fact intensive inquiry without a precise standard,
the 9th Circuit concluded
The facts presented in the district court establish that Washington has acted
affirmatively to build and maintain barrier culverts under its roads… If these
culverts were replaced or modified to allow free passage of fish, several hundred
thousand additional mature salmon would be produced every year. Many of
these mature salmon would be available to the Tribes for harvest. Salmon now
available for harvest are not sufficient to provide a “moderate living” to the
Tribes.102
95
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So what exactly was the role of the “moderate living” standard? When the 9th Circuit
denied the petition for re-hearing en banc, Judges Fletcher and Gould who were
members of the panel decision, strongly objected to the dissent characterizing their
holding as guaranteeing the tribal fishermen a moderate living standard, stating
Our opinion does not hold that the Tribes are entitled to enough salmon to provide a
moderate living, irrespective of the circumstances… Nor do we hold that the promise
is valid against all human-caused diminutions, or even against all State-caused
diminutions. We hold only that the State violated the Treaties when it acted
affirmatively to build roads across salmon bearing streams, with culverts that allowed
passage of water but not passage of salmon.103
During the oral argument at the Supreme Court, the United States and the tribes denied
advocating that the state had a duty to make sure that Indian fishermen could achieve a
“moderate living standard” through fishing activities.104 But if that is not the standard for
the state’s duty, what is?
An analysis of the 9th Circuit decision reveals that it relied on two main arguments:
First, the treaty had to be construed the way the Indians understood it. As stated by the
9th Circuit,
The Indians did not understand the Treaties to promise that they would have access
to their usual and accustomed fishing places, but with a qualification that would allow
the government to diminish or destroy the fish runs. Governor Stevens did not make,
and the Indians did not understand him to make, such a cynical and disingenuous
promise. The Indians reasonably understood Governor Stevens to promise not only
that they would have access to their usual and accustomed fishing places, but also
that there would be fish sufficient to sustain them. They reasonably understood that
they would have, in Stevens' words, “food and drink ... forever.” 105
Secondly, the treaty had to be interpreted in a manner consistent with fulfilling the
“purpose” of the treaty.106 The purpose of the treaty was to guarantee the Indians an
adequate or sufficient supply of fish to feed themselves.
The problem for the State was that in the lower courts, it had argued that it had no
duty whatsoever to protect the tribes’ treaty rights from potentially nefarious state
initiated activities.107 At the Supreme Court, however, it seemed to change course and
when asked if there was any limits on state activities tending to reduce the salmon
population, the State’s Attorney General first mentioned that the state could not erect a
barrier “causing a large decline in a particular river that is not justified by substantial
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compelling interests.”108 When pushed further about what is meant by a “large” decline,
the state’s Attorney General mentioned that the state could not do something that would
cause a substantial degradation of the salmon habitat resulting in a reduction of the
number of salmons by 50% or more.109
According to the State, because all parties modified the arguments in their briefs to
the Supreme Court, the Case should be remanded once the Court decided which
standard would control the State’s duty. The Supreme Court affirmance of the 9th
Circuit decision by an equal 4-4 vote shows that the Justices may have been hopelessly
deadlocked as to what that standard or limiting principle should be.110
Limiting principles could also come into play in Cougar Den v. Washington, a case
the Court will hear next term.111 At stake in the case is whether the state of Washington
could impose on a tribal corporation a tax for fuel used for the propulsion of motor
vehicles on state highways. The Tribe is arguing that Article III of an 1855 treaty,
securing to tribal members “the right, in common with citizens of the United states, to
travel upon all public highways,”112 preempted the state fuel tax because the fuel is
necessary for trvel upon the public highway. The State argued that this case is not
about the right to travel but primarily about the right to trade which is not one of those
rights guaranteed under the treaty. The tribe disagrees, arguing that the right to trade is,
in some cases such as this one, subsumed in the right to travel. The State Supreme
Court agreed with the Tribe.113 After stating that the treaty has to be interpreted the way
the Indians understood it at the time of the signing, the State Court remarked that at the
time the treaty was signed, the right to travel for the purpose of bringing goods to and
from the reservation was essential to the Indians.
There is room for disagreement about whether the facts of the case involve the right
to trade and not the right to travel or vice versa. However, the Court’s decision to grant
cert may signify that at least four Justices do not see enough of a limiting principle in the
state Supreme Court’s interpretation of the treaty. These Justices may more readily
agree with the dissent when it stated
[w]hat this ruling puts at risk is Washington's, and potentially other states', ability to
tax goods consumed within its borders. A simple extension of the majority's logic
would allow nontribal members to avoid the imposition of state use, excise, or sales
tax on goods they consume through a contrived transport by Yakama Nation or Nez

108

Transcript of oral arguments at p. 5, 12 and 25. The United States answered that under established
Supreme Court precedent, the state could only regulate the salmon runs for the purpose of conservation.
Id., at p. 46, relying on a trio of Puyallup decisions, the most notable being Puyallup Tribe v. Department
of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 174-177 (1977)
109
Id., at pp 14, and 16.
110
Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (2018) (Affirming by an equally divided Court).
111
th
Docket No. 16-1498, petition for Certiorari granted June 25 , 2018.
112
Treaty with the Yakamas, 12 Stat. 951, at 952-953 (1855).
113
Cougar Den, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Licensing, 392 P.3d 1014 (2017).

17

Perce tribal members. The majority provides no clear limits. Transport is necessary
to bring many goods to market.114
In its brief to the Supreme Court, the State picked up on the dissent’s argument and
argued that if the Supreme Court were to adopt the State Court’s position that any trade
that requires the use of public roads involves the right to travel, “the consequences for
state and federal taxing powers would be immense.”115 Therefore, the State urged the
Court to adopt the principle that any exemptions from state taxes imposed on off
reservation activities should be expressly authorized under federal law.116 If the
Washington Court’s decision did not contain enough of a limiting principle, the State’s
argument here imposes too much of one. The Tribe on the other hand comes up with a
different limiting principle. In its brief to the Supreme Court, it argued that “the right-totravel provision would not preempt taxation of acts distinct from the exercise of treaty
rights, such as off-reservation economic transactions occurring before or after the
highway travel.”117 Whether this is enough of a limiting principle for the Court remains to
be seen. Perhaps a good compromise would be to hold that the state cannot impose its
fuel tax on any tribal travel involving bringing goods to and from the reservation.
Herrera v. Wyoming is another case involving off reservation treaty rights that the
Court will hear next term.118 In the case, Mr. Herrera, a member of the Crow Tribe,
received a citation from Wyoming for hunting in the Big Horn National Forest where he
had killed three elks during the off-season while outside the reservation. Herrera
pleaded not guilty, contending that he was exercising his hunting rights pursuant to
Article IV of t the 1868 Treaty between the United States and the Crow tribe.119 In that
treaty, the Crow tribe ceded vast amounts of land to the United States but in Article IV, it
insisted that tribal members shall continue to “have the right to hunt on the unoccupied
lands of the United States.”120
In its petition against the grant of Certiorari, the State first argued that the Plaintiffs’
case was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel as the identical issue had already
been decided by the Tenth Circuit in 1995 in Crow Indian Tribe v. Repsis.121 In Repsis,
the 10th Circuit held that under a United States Supreme Court precedent, Ward v.
Racehorse,122 the Crow Tribe’s treaty rights were abrogated upon Montana’s admission
114
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into the Union “on an equal footing“ with the original thirteen colonies. The tribal plaintiff
in his petition argued that a subsequent decision by the Supreme Court, Minnesota v.
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,123 had overturned Ward v. Racehorse. Therefore,
Res Judicata should not bar the litigation. The state countered that Mille Lacs did not
completely overturn the Racehorse decision. Therefore, the issue was precluded.124
Should the tribe convince the Court that the Mille Lacs decision completely
overturned Racehorse and, therefore, the treaty right survived Montana’s admission into
the Union, the Court may have to decide the core treaty interpretation issue: Did the
creation of a National Forest terminate the status of the land on which Herrera was
hunting as “unoccupied lands of the United States.”125 Herrera and the United States
take the position that the term “unoccupied lands of the United States” refer to lands
that have not been settled by non-Indians under the Homestead laws. On the other
hand, the State is arguing that lands comprising a National Forest can no longer be
settled and therefore these lands are no longer unoccupied.
The United States is also arguing that hunting is not incompatible with the creation of
a National Forest. Except for Repsis, most of the lower courts that have considered the
issue have ruled that continued hunting is not per se inconsistent with the creation of a
National forest, at least if there is no active logging occurring in it.126 Creation of a
National Park, on the other hand, does terminate the “unoccupied” status of the land as
continued hunting would be inconsistent with one of the major purpose of a National
Park.127 The different treatment between National Forest and National Park adopted by
most courts that have considered this issue seems fair and rational.
PART IV: A Cautionary Tale: State taxation in Indian Country and the level
playing field principle.
The foundational principle here is that States used to have no jurisdiction
whatsoever inside Indian Country.128 However, 127 years after first denying states any
kind of jurisdiction, the Court formulated a new test in its 1959 decision in Williams v.
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Lee,129 when it stated “[e]ssentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question
has always been whether the state actions infringed on the right of reservation Indians
to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”130 Although the Court stated that “the
question has always been” whether state action infringed on tribal self-government, this
was really a novel way to phrase the question. Until then, the Court had only allowed
states to assume jurisdiction in three types of situation: First, criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians who had committed crimes against other non-Indians inside Indian
reservations.131 Second, the Court had allowed reservation Indians to sue non-Indians
in state courts.132 Third, the Court had also allowed state taxation of non-Indian property
inside Indian reservations when such taxation would not interfere with treaty rights
possessed by Indians.133
The issue in Williams was not about the reach of state taxing power but whether
a non-Indian could sue a tribal member residing on the Navajo reservation in a state
court to collect on a debt the tribal member had incurred while on the reservation.
Having laid down the test described above, the Supreme Court denied the state court
jurisdiction because “There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state
jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of tribal courts over Reservation affairs
and hence would infringe on the right of Indians to govern themselves.”134 That test
became known as the “infringement” test. In 1973, however, the Court appeared to
adopt a new test when it stated
The trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to
state jurisdiction, and toward the reliance on federal preemption. The modern
cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notion of Indian sovereignty and to
look instead at the applicable treaties and statutes which defines the limits of
state power.135
Although at first, it seemed that this new “Indian preemption” test was moving away
from the search for a level playing field and towards a search for congressional intent,
the Court veered back toward a balancing of the interest test when it stated that the
Indian preemption inquiry
is not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal
sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state,
federal and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in
the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.136
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Eventually, the infringement and the Indian preemption tests merged into one
flexible balancing inquiry. Thus, in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,137 the Court
declared “State jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or
is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the State
interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of State authority.”138 In a later
case, Justice Ginsburg explained the value of a balancing test for reaching a level
playing field in this area of the law
Balancing tests have been criticized as rudderless, affording insufficient guidance
to decisionmakers. Pointed as the criticism may be, one must ask, as in life's
choices generally, what is the alternative. The principle of tribal self-government,
grounded in notions of inherent sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks
an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes, and the Federal
Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other. No “bright
line” test is capable of achieving such an accommodation with respect to state
taxes formally imposed on non-Indians, but impacting on-reservation ventures.139
Generally speaking, the Court has highlighted four essential factors in
determining whether state law has been preempted under this balancing test. Weighing
in favor of tribal interests and therefore indicating preemption are first, whether there is
a “backdrop” of tribal sovereignty and immunity from state regulation in the area being
regulated,140 and secondly, whether the activity the state wants to regulate involves a
value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribe.141 On the other
hand, state interests are more important when the activity occurring on the reservation
could have serious off-reservation effects.142 Finally, the Court has stated that “(t)he
exercise of state authority which imposes additional burdens on a tribal enterprise must
ordinarily be justified by functions or services performed by the State in connection with
the on-reservation activity.”143
The formulation and application of the Indian preemption test was initially heavily
influenced by Justice Thurgood Marshall. The use of the balancing test in the opinions
where he was in the majority reflected a legitimate effort to find a level playing field
between the tribal interests on one hand and state interests on the other.144 It is
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important to realize, however, that Justice Rehnquist never believed in a balancing test.
In a concurrent and dissenting opinion in Washington v. Confederated Tribes he
objected to any balancing stating “I see no need for this Court to balance the state and
tribal interests in enacting particular forms of taxation in order to determine their validity.
Absent discrimination, the question is only one of congressional intent. Either Congress
intended to pre-empt the state taxing authority or it did not.”145 In that same 1980
opinion, Justice Rehnquist gave a meaningful hint on what was preoccupying him. The
case was about the power of the state of Washington to tax non-members buying
cigarettes from tribal retailers on the reservation. In upholding the state taxing authority,
Justice Rehnquist stated
It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons
coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in which the
Tribes have a significant interest. What the smokeshops offer these customers, and
what is not available elsewhere, is solely an exemption from state taxation… We do
not believe that principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of preemption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market
an exemption from state taxation to persons who would normally do their business
elsewhere.146
At first, this language seems to fit into the level playing field principle between states
and tribes. However, it is far from it. If it were, Indian tribes should be able to force the
states to collect tribal tax from off reservation vendors selling to people residing on
Indian reservations. Secondly, this “marketing an exemption” principle has no
application to state residents purchasing goods outside their own state of residence.
People living in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs routinely buy their liquor in the
District of Columbia because it is cheaper there. Many people residing in the State of
Washington buy expensive goods in Oregon because Oregon has no sales tax. The
“marketing an exemption” principle is not about levelling the playing field. If anything, it
is about un-leveling the field to subrogate tribal interests to the interests of the states.
Rehnquist may not have wanted the tribes to benefit from what he perceived to
be an unfair advantage but in allowing state taxation in that case, the Court gave a
disincentive for anyone but the tribe’s members to buy cigarettes on the reservations.
The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart made a valid point when it
stated
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when a State and an Indian tribe tax in a functionally identical manner the same
on-reservation sales to nontribal members, it is my view that congressional policy
conjoined with the Indian Commerce Clause requires the State to credit against
its own tax the amount of the tribe's tax... it permits the tribe to share with the
State in the tax revenues from cigarette sales, without at the same time placing
the tribe's federally encouraged enterprises at a competitive disadvantage
compared to similarly situated off-reservation businesses.147
Unfortunately for the tribes, although Justice Marshall’s version of the Indian preemption
inquiry initially carried the day, Rehnquist's version of that inquiry seemed to have
prevailed in more recent times. In the last thirty years, there has been many cases
allowing states taxation in Indian Country.148 While the Court used a balancing of the
interest test to determine the extent of state taxation of non-members up to 1989, it
pretty much abandoned any attempt at real balancing in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico.149 The issue in Cotton Petroleum was whether the state could impose a
severance tax on oil and gas produced by a non-Indian corporation whose income was
generated from land it was leasing from the Tribe within the Mescalero Apache Indian
reservation. The Court held that the state tax was not preempted. Founding no
“backdrop of tribal sovereignty” in this area of the law, the Court took the position that
there was no presumption in favor of preemption. Instead, the Court asked whether
subsequent legislation could be construed as preempting such state taxation and found
none. In dissent, Justice Blackmun thought that the majority had given up on a true
balancing of the interests, and stated
Instead of engaging in a careful examination of state, tribal and federal interests .
. . the majority has adopted the principle of “the inexorable zero”. . . [u]nder the
majority's approach, there is no pre-emption unless the States are entirely
excluded from a sphere of activity and provide no services to the Indians or to the
lessees they seek to tax.150
Furthermore, the dissent also noted that in finding that state taxation here would not
impose any economic burden on the tribe, the Court blinded itself to the economics of
oil and gas production. As stated by the Dissent: “The fact that the Jicarilla Apache have
seen fit to impose their own taxes renders the threat to tribal interests which is always
inherent in state taxation all the more apparent. The market can bear only so much
taxation, and it is inevitable that a point will be reached at which the State's taxes will
impose a ceiling on tribal tax revenues.” 151
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After Cotton Petroleum, when the facts guiding the Indian preemption balancing
inquiry seemed to disfavor state taxation, the Court found other ways to allow state
taxation. For instance in Blaze Construction,152 the court refused to use the Indian
preemption doctrine because the non-Indian contractor in charge of a road improvement
project was working pursuant to a contract with the federal government. Why should
the fact that a contract is with the federal government matters when it comes to the
application of the Indian preemption doctrine? The Court had only this to say: “The need
to avoid litigation and to ensure efficient tax administration counsels in favor of a brightline standard for taxation of federal contracts, regardless of whether the contracted-for
activity takes place on Indian reservations.153
Another case where the Court refused to use the balancing of the interest test
was Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation.154 The issue in Wagnon was whether
the State of Kansas could impose an excise tax on fuel sold by a non-Indian distributor
to the Prairie Band of Potawatomi Nation. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
had ruled against the state tax using the traditional balancing preemption test.155 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state taxing statute meant to tax the receipt of
the fuel by the first distributor and not its subsequent sale to the tribe. Therefore, the
balancing test was not applicable because the tax incurred by the non-Indian distributor
occurred off the reservation.156
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that although the tax was formally
imposed on the non-Indian distributor, in reality, the tax burdened reservation activities.
According to her, the tax should have been considered as having taken place on the
Indian reservation because under the applicable statute, “[t]o whom and where the
distributor sells are the criteria that determine the ‘transactions' on which ‘[n]o tax is . . .
imposed, and correspondingly the transaction on which the tax is imposed.”’157 Another
instance where the Court showed its blindness to the economic realities on the ground
occurred when Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, asserted that the tribe's
“[d]ecision to impose a tax should have no effect on its net revenues from the operation
of the station.”158 As Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent: “[a]s a practical matter, however,
the two tolls cannot coexist.”159
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In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,160 a case decided the same year as
Wagnon, Justice Ginsburg was not as sympathetic to the tribe. The issue there was
whether the City could tax property the Oneida Indian Nation had recently bought. The
tribe was arguing that the property was not taxable because it was located within the
tribe’s ancestral treaty reservation. The city was arguing that the area where the Tribe
had recently acquired its land was no longer within the exterior border of the
reservation. The Court, per Justice Ginsburg, disagreed and upheld the right of the City
to tax tribal property. Refusing to answer whether the properties were within the
ancestral tribal treaty reservation, the Court instead grounded its holding in the three
equitable doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.161
The Court also added some confusing language that allowed lower courts to
greatly expand on an already, to put it kindly, innovative application of the law. First, it
fashioned a new principle under which Indian tribes cannot invoke their sovereign
powers if it would be disruptive of the settled and justifiable expectations of state
entities.162 The Court also added “When a party belatedly asserts a right to present
and future sovereign control over territory, longstanding observances and settled
expectations are prime considerations. There is no dispute that it has been two
centuries since the Oneidas last exercised regulatory control over the properties here or
held them free from local taxation.”163
Later in the opinion, Justice Ginsburg implicitly acknowledged that lack of limiting
principles were at play in the Court’s decision. Thus, she stated “If OIN may unilaterally
reassert sovereign control and remove these parcels from the local tax rolls, little would
prevent the Tribe from initiating a new generation of litigation to free the parcels from
local zoning or other regulatory controls that protect all landowners in the area.”164
Although Justice Ginsburg asserted that “the question of damages for the Tribe's
ancient dispossession is not at issue in this case, and we therefore do not disturb our
holding in Oneida II,”165 lower courts have interpreted City of Sherrill as preventing any
remedies,166 including monetary damages, that would be disruptive of the long standing
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expectations of non-Indians.167 Also forbidden would be any tribal claim premised on
the Oneidas’ assertion of a valid title to their original reservation.168
I am willing to agree that the actions of the Oneida Indian Nation in City of Sherrill
disrupted the settled expectations of the taxing governmental entities. However, if that
is the case, a fair level playing field between the tribes and the states would call for a
prohibition on the states, counties, and towns from disrupting the justifiable and settled
expectations of Indian tribes. Yet none of that was ever mentioned in Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie when years after passage of Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA), the Court held that tribally owned land was not Indian country and, and
therefore, the tribe had no sovereign power to tax non-members working on those
lands.169 The same applies to the situation in Carcieri v. Salazar,170 where 75 years
after enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),171 the Court discovered that
tribes not under federal jurisdiction as of 1934, could not petition the federal government
to take land into trust for them. Not to mention older decisions like Tee-hit-ton Indians v.
United States which held that Alaskan Native tribes never had recognized title to lands
they thought was theirs since time immemorial.172 And this is just the proverbial tip of
the iceberg. One could write a book about all the Supreme Court cases that have upset
the settled and justifiable expectations of Indian tribes throughout history.173
CONCLUSION:
The Indian preemption doctrine started out as a mean of balancing conflicting
tribal and state interests but was, in the long run, hijacked by Justices such as Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who did not believe in any level playing field or, for that matter, in
tribal sovereignty. What happened to the Indian preemption doctrine should serve as a
cautionary tale for all cases where the Court attempts to use limiting principles or reach
level playing fields.
Every legal doctrine or principle of law has policy goals behind it. Sometime,
courts officially delineate the policies underlying the principle of law or doctrine on which
their decisions purportedly rest. Other times, there are unstated background norms and
goals not officially mentioned by the Court that nevertheless play a crucial role in the
decisions. This article has argued that when it comes to off-reservation tribal sovereign
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immunity and off reservation treaty rights, the Court has been looking for limiting
principles purporting to establish level playing fields between the tribes and the states.
Whether a level playing field has been achieved, however, is in the eyes of the beholder
as it involves a subjective judgment. It is also a goal that may not be truly reachable
because of the different constitutional status of Tribes and States. As the areas of tribal
jurisdiction over non-members and state taxation on Indian reservations have shown,
limiting principles can easily be manipulated against tribal sovereign interests. One can
only hope that the same thing does not happen to the areas of tribal sovereign immunity
and tribal treaty rights.
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